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Indeterminate sentencing, I once an indomitable element of Ameri-

can penology, has recently come under attack by theorists and politicians of every ideological persuasion.2 Several writers have criticized

the injustice of indeterminate sentencing both in its failure to punish
similarly situated offenders equally3 and in its disregard for the princi* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. B.S. 1969, J.D. 1972, University of Utah. The
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THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN
PUNISHMENT (1976), hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT,
A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976) hereinafter cited as A. VON HIRSCH;
A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN, THE QUESTION OF PAROLE: RETENTION, REFORM OR
ABOLITION? (1979), hereinafter cited as A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN.
1. The expression "indeterminate sentencing" has several meanings. It may describe a process in which the judge or other sentencing authority is vested with wide discretion in setting either
minimum and maximum terms of incarceration (e.g., 10 to 20 years) or an exact term of incarceration (e.g., 10 years or 20 years). These terms may later be administratively modified. See Giorno,
Sentencing in Criminal Cases.- How Great the Needfor Reform?, 13 U. RICH. L. REV. 899, 901
(1979). The expression can also refer to a system in which an administrative board sets the duration of a sentence while the sentence is being served. Finally, "indeterminate sentencing" can
describe a process whereby a nominally fixed sentence is subject to the normal rules of parole. A
correctional agency administers these rules after a statutorily prescribed percentage of the sentence has been served. Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 299 (1974).
In short, the term "describe[s] any prison sentence for which the precise term of confinement
is not known on the day of judgment but will be subject within a substantial range to the later
decision of a parole board or some comparable agency under whatever name." M. FRANKEL,
CRIMINAL SENTENCES 86 (1972).
2. Disillusionment with indeterminate sentencing is expressed by a range of thinkers from
Alan Dershowitz to Ernest van den Haag and by a range of politicians from Senator Edward M.
Kennedy to James Baker, a former Republican nominee for Texas Attorney General. See TASK
FORCE REPORT 3-4; E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 176-77, 191-95 (1975); Crump,
Determinate Sentencing. The Promises and Perils of Sentence Guidelines, 68 KY. L.J. 1, 4 n.6
(1979); Kennedy, Symposium on Sentencing (pt. 1), 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 1-4 (1978).
3. See, e.g., A. VON HIRSCH 72-74.
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ple of proportioning punishment to the gravity of the offense.4 Others
fault indeterminate sentencing for its ineffectiveness in deterring future
criminal activity.5 Calls for determinate sentencing systems, 6 already

heeded by several legislatures, 7 abound and almost certainly will increase.8

Although determinate sentencing systems are often advocated to
promote justice, they carry substantial risks of undue harshness be4. See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 30-31 (1971). See
also M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 8-10.
5. See generally N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); J. WILSON, THINKING
ABOUT CRIME 162-82 (1975); van den Haag, Punitive Sentences, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 123 (1978).
6. A determinate sentencing system is one in which discretion in fixing the term of incarceration is withdrawn from the judge or other sentencing authority and replaced by a legislatively
determined term, either fixed or narrowly variable, for each defined crime. See text accompanying notes 43-47 infra.
7. As of October 1980, no jurisdiction has adopted a complete system of determinate sentencing. Many state systems do, however, contain elements of fixed sentencing, manifested particularly in "habitual offender" statutes. See Crump, supra note 2, at 7 n.19. For other examples of
fixed sentencing statutes see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.087(2) (West Supp. 1980) (mandating a minimum three-year sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of certain violent
crimes); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.227(b) (Supp. 1976-77), as amended by Act of Feb. 11,
1976, Pub. Act No. 6 (effective Jan. 1, 1977) (mandating a two-year prison sentence for anyone
who possesses a firearm at the time of the commission of a felony); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2401 (West Supp. 1978) (mandating fixed sentences for certain violations of the Uniform Controlled Substance Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 2-101 to -610 (West Supp. 1978)); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.92.090 (West 1977) (mandating life imprisonment for the commission of a third
felony); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (Michie 1977) (mandating life imprisonment upon conviction of
a third felony).
A number of states have recently enacted presumptive sentencing systems. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 1170-1170.6 (West Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 1005-8-1 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1980); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-50-1-1 to 35-50-6-6 (Bums Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 244.01-.11 (West Supp. 1979); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1381-1386 (Purdon Supp. 1980). In
addition, 35 other states are considering revisions of their sentencing laws. See Zalman, Making
Sentencing Guidelines Work. A Response to ProfessorCoffee, 67 GEo. L.J. 1005 (1979). See generally MandatorySentencing Statutes Enactedin Eighteen States, JUSTICE ASSISTANCE NEWS, April
1980, at 9.
8. See authorities cited in notes 2-5 supra. See generally D. FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING
PROOF: THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS (1975). Perhaps the purest system of mandatory
sentencing is that advocated in AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 4, at 144: "[A]ll
offenders in a broad class-such as type of crime, but not according to the unique characteristics
of the individual-are to be treated alike. Whatever sanction... is imposed is to be fixed by law.
" A representative proposal of a presumpThere is to be no discretion in setting sentences ....
tive sentencing system is set forth in A. VON HIRSCH 99-101.
One commentator has described the current plea to replace indeterminate with determinate
systems as an "au courant cause [that] may become a 'motherhood' issue that all espouse in principle and defend vociferously against already vanquished opponents." Coffee, TheRepressedIssues
ofSentencing: Accountability, Predictability,andEqualityin the Era ofthe Sentencing Commission,
66 GEO. L.J. 975, 976 (1978). Another commentator notes: "Determinate sentencing has arrived
in this nation with the force of an idea whose time has come. From Maine... to California...
more and more jurisdictions are considering, drafting and adopting definite sentencing systems."
Crump, supra note 2, at 3.
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cause of their inflexibility. 9 Some proposed determinate systems, as

well as some laws already in use,' 0 ignore circumstances that do not

rise to the level of substantive defenses but that nevertheless relate to

the individual offender's culpability.II This failure to link punishment
to the character and circumstances of the offender as well as to his of2
fense, leads to undeservedly harsh sentences.'
Recent proposals for determinate sentencing typically attempt to
proportion the degree of punishment to the seriousness of the offense,
thus assuming the feasibility of an a priori measurement of offender
fault and victim harm in determining appropriate sentences.' 3 Because
such measurements are at best inexact,' 4 the determinate sentencing
9. See text accompanying notes 45-47 infra.
10. For an example of a proposed system of essentially fixed sentencing see generally AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 4. For examples of individual statutes fixing punishment
to offense, see note 7 supra.
11. Fixed-punishment statutes generally dictate a specific penalty upon conviction of the offense, see note 7 supra, established by proving the actus reus and mens rea aspects of the crime.
Although traditional criminal responsibility defenses such as insanity and mistake of fact are
available to offenders in fixed-sentencing systems, the traditional substantive defenses do not permit a thorough inquiry into offender culpability. Criteria such as the offender's motives (as opposed to his intentions) for committing the crime, his unique powers of self-control, the strength of
his temptations, his exposure to debilitating social and economic deprivation-indeed his whole
character-are all relevant to assessing culpability. See A. EWING, THE MORALITY OF PUNISHMENT 37 (1929); Ezorsky, The Ethics of Punishment,in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT xxii-xxvi (G. Ezorsky ed. 1972). But such an inquiry is precluded at the guilt stage of the
criminal trial; it is relevant only at sentencing and then only under indeterminate sentencing models. See J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 96-101 (2d ed. 1960); S. RUBIN, LAW
OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 82-83 (2d ed. 1973).
12. See, e.g., In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974) (holding a
mandatory minimum term often years for a second narcotics offense too harsh for the offender in
his circumstances).
13. See, e.g., A. VON HIRSCH 66-94. "Seriousness" is a function of the characteristic harmfulness of the conduct and the culpability of the offender. A "proportionate" sentence is one that
matches in severity the degree of culpability of the offender plus the harm (or risk of harm) to
others in the offense itself. Id.
14. Some of the problems inherent in the endeavor to proportion punishments to the gravity
of offenses are noted by Hugo Adam Bedau in his discussion of von Hirsch's suggestions, see note
13 supra.
First, the principle of commensurate deserts requires a mode of measurement for
degrees of culpability in offenders. Even if we can agree that a malicious killer is morally and legally more culpable than an accidental killer, how are we to answer the question, 'How much more culpable is he-twice as culpable? ten times? seven and one half
times?' Second, the principle needs a mode of measurement for degrees of harm inflicted
by different offenses. Granted that murder is more harmful than rape, how much worse
is it in terms of harm to the victim (or to society)? Twice as harmful? Ten times as
harmful? The concepts of culpability and harmfulness are not like the concepts of temperature or ductility because we lack standard units in terms of which to measure them,
something we do not lack for the latter. Third, we need a way of combining the two
concepts--culpability and harmfulness-into one common concept of gravity of offense.
Without a common measure for these concepts, there is no way of telling, e.g., whether
an offense that falls on the mid-point of the culpability scale and the bottom of the
harmfulness scale is exactly as grave or half as grave, or twice as grave, as an offense that
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movement will likely precipitate disagreements about the "proper"
punishment for a given crime. 15 The disagreements are certain to be
reflected in cross-jurisdictional disparities in punishment for particular
offenses. Such disparities in turn will likely fuel claims of poor legislative determinations of punishment from offenders who receive harsher
sentences for offenses than they would have received for the same
crime elsewhere.16
Although these problems also exist in systems of indeterminate
sentencing,17 these systems' typically wide range of legislative penalties
for a given offense as well as their broad grants of judicial and administrative discretion, provide some cushion against injustice. Under indeterminate schemes, the sentencing authority can consider a wide variety
of circumstances bearing on the offender's fault in fashioning sentences
within the broad range of legislatively set penalties for the particular
crime.' 8 This flexibility promotes dispositions consistent with the
deserts of individual offenders. Indeterminate sentencing systems also
lessen the possibility of punishment disproportionate to a given offense
by allowing the judge to use probation in lieu of imprisonment, or to
impose the minimum sentence legislatively established for the offense,
or by permitting correctional authorities to grant early parole release.' 9
falls on the mid-point of the harmfulness scale but at the bottom of the culpability scale.
Culpability and harmfulness seem to be not even as like each other as the proverbial
apples and oranges; the latter are, after all members of a common genus, whereas no
genus subsumes both degrees of fault and degrees of harm.
Bedau, Concessions to Retributionin Punishment, in JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT 51, 64 (J. Cederblom & W. Blizek eds. 1977). See also Pincoffs, Are Questions ofDesert Decidable?, in JUSTICE
AND PUNISHMENT, supra, at 75, 85.
15. Some commentators think that the recent attempt at determinate sentencing by the Indiana Legislature, for example, see note 7 supra,establishes excessive penalties. SeeA. vON HIRSCH
& K. HANRAHAN 86. For an illustration of the divergence of scholarly opinion about which penalties are proportionate to given crimes, compare the kinds and degrees of penalties recommended
in A. VON HIRSCH 106-17 (relatively short periods of incarceration, capital punishment impermissible), with those spelled out in D. FOGEL, supranote 8, at 254-55 (longer periods of incarceration,
capital punishment permitted). See also Alschuler, SentencingReform andProsecutorialPower A
Critiqueof Recent Proposals/or"ixed' and "Presumptive'Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 569
(1978); Wilson, The Political Feasibility ofPunishment, in JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT, supra note
14, at 107, 108-10.
16. Cases in which offenders have made such eighth amendment arguments under existing
determinate sentencing legislation include Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 141-42 (4th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied,415 U.S. 983 (1974); Inre Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 917-18, 519 P.2d 1073, 1077, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 649, 653 (1974).
17. A vivid example is In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972) in
which the California Supreme Court found an indeterminate sentence possibly amounting to fife
imprisonment to be unduly harsh as applied to an offender convicted of a second offense of indecent exposure.
18. See note 11 supra.
19. For a discussion of indeterminate sentencing and its use of parole see A. VON HIRSCH &
K. HANRAHAN 27-38.
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Nevertheless, the question of disproportionate penalties under
emerging determinate sentencing systems did not, until recently, pose a
significant problem. Nascent doctrine under the cruel-and-unusualpunishments clause of the eighth amendment 2o and analogous state
constitutional provisions offered promise as a judicial means well
suited to solving the problem of the disproportionality of punishment
in an era of determinate sentencing. 2' The recent Supreme Court decision in Rummel v. Estelle,22 however, makes it doubtful that defendants
can continue to use the eighth amendment in such fashion in non-capital cases.
This Article (1) reviews the trend toward determinate sentencing
and the problems that have arisen and that may arise; (2) shows that
before Rummel a developing body of case law was satisfactorily solving
those problems; (3) analyzes .Rummel and its departure from the preceding case law; and (4) evaluates the likely alternatives to judicial review for preventing excessive punishment.
I.

THE DETERMINATE SENTENCING TREND AND THE PROBLEMS OF

EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT

Although the shift towards determinate sentencing has been discussed in great detail,23 an overview of that shift is necessary to illustrate the issues that are likely to pose problems. Because determinate
sentencing may take a variety of forms, it is also necessary to examine
these varieties closely and to discuss the specific problems of excessive
punishment entailed in each.
A.

The Decline of IndeterminateSentencing.

Until recently indeterminate sentencing was a component of almost all American penal systems. 24 Although many systems contained
some elements of determinacy-mandatory penalties for habitual offenders, for example 25-the exercise of broad judicial and administrative discretion in tailoring sentences for particular offenders
characterized the sentencing practice. Sentencing was designed to re20. "[C]ruel and unusual punishments [shall not be] inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
21. See notes 63-155 infra and accompanying text.
22. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). See notes 159-206 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of
Rummel.
23. See, e.g., R. SINGER, JUST DESERTS 1-34 (1979); Crump, supra note 2.
24. "Mhe administrative sentencing model with its indeterminate sentence is the dominant
mechanism of involuntary confinement currently employed in the United States." Dershowitz,
BackgroundPaper, in TASK FORCE REPORT 67, 97 (1976). "At least forty states and the federal
government utilize what is known as indeterminate sentencing." Giorno, supranote 1, at 900.
25. See Crump, supra note 2, at 6-7.
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habilitate, not to punish or deter criminal offenders. 26 The length of
prison sentences was therefore determined less by the seriousness of the
crime than by the individual offender's need for treatment and his propensity for future criminal behavior. The emphasis on rehabilitation
precluded a priori legislative sentencing determinations and instead re27
quired grants of considerable discretion to sentencing authorities.
Not only were deterrence and retribution only faintly reflected in inde-

terminate sentencing systems, but advocates of such systems often charpenology,
acterized those considerations as remnants of outmoded
28

inappropriate for an enlightened sentencing theory.
All of this has changed. In the face of a steadily rising crime rate,
penologists and legislators have now begun to question whether inde-

terminate sentencing actually achieves its objectives. 29 Recent studies
have cast doubt on the ability of the criminal justice system to rehabilitate offenders; the data indicate that treatment programs have seldom
30
reduced, and in some cases have actually increased, recidivism rates.

Similarly, there is widespread disillusionment with indeterminate sentencing as a means of preventive detention of dangerous persons. Accurately predicting dangerousness is extremely difficult. 3' Judges and

26. Carlson, The Future of Prisons, TRIAL, March 1976, at 29; Dershowitz, supra note 1, at
298-99; Giomo, supra note 1, at 900-01.
27. Indeterminate sentencing vests broad discretionary power in prison and parole authorities along with various diagnostic and treatment specialists, on the assumption that these people

are best qualified to make decisions as to each inmate's need for treatment. Dershowitz, supra
note 24, at 93-98.
28. "The salient 20th century fact about criminal law is widespread skepticism of punishment. . . . [R]etribution is sharply disparaged as, at best, a disguised form of vengeance." Hall,
Justicein the 20th Century, 59 CAL. L. REV. 752, 753 (1971). "T]he concept of punishment has no

place in enlightened criminology." Lelyveld, in PuNISHMENr: FOR AND AGAINST 57, 81 (H. Hart
ed. 1971). The 1966 Manual of Correctional Standards published by the American Correctional
Association stated the "modem" view in unequivocal terms:
Punishment as retribution belongs to a penal philosophy that is archaic and discredited
by history .

. .

. Penologists in the United States today are generally agreed that the

prison serves most effectively for the protection of society against crime when its major
emphasis is on rehabilitation. They accept this as a fact that no longer needs to be debated.
Quoted in Carlson, supra note 26, at 29.
29. See authorities cited in note 23 supra.
30. A study by Dr. Robert Martinson of 231 rehabilitation projects, conducted here and
abroad between 1945 and 1967, concluded that "[w]ith few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have no appreciable effect on recidivism." J. WILSON,
supranote 5, at 169; see Bennet, Rehabilitationin Check, TRIAL, March 1976, at 12; Carlson, supra
note 26, at 32; Flynn, Turning Judges Into Robot, TRIAL, March 1976, at 18.
31. "Despite the weight of authority supporting the principle of dangerousness, it must be
rejected because it presupposes a capacity to predict quite beyond our present or foreseeable technical ability." Morris, The Future of Imprisonment: Towarda Primitive Philosophy, 72 MIcH. L.
REV. 1161, 1167 (1974). See also A. VON HIRSCH 21; Dershowitz, supra note 24, at 98.
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parole boards in fact tend to overpredict dangerousness, 32 thus unjustifiably confining many non-dangerous individuals. 33 Many criticize indeterminate sentencing for its failure to provide rules and standards to
guide sentencing and correctional officials in their exercise of discretion.3 4 Neither judges nor parole boards are required to articulate reasons for their decisions; those decisions are, in any event, rarely
reviewed by appellate courts. 35 This exercise of unchecked discretion

has often resulted in disparity in punishments imposed upon similarly
situated offenders, 36 as well as in punishments disproportionate to the
seriousness of particular offenses. 37 Moreover, offenders often perceive
additional injustice in indeterminate sentencing because they see uncertainty about the actual period of confinement as a painful and un-

38
necessary aspect of prison life.

B.

The Emergence of DeterminateSentencing.

As the "rehabilitative ideal" 39 began to fall from favor, determinate sentencing proposals that were believed to promote justice and to
deter crime gained popularity. By fixing sentences proportionate to the
seriousness of particular offenses, legislators could eliminate disparities
in punishments between similarly situated offenders and give each of-

fender his "just deserts." 40 Fixed sentences, with limitations on probation and parole, would also increase the certainty of the degree of

punishment upon conviction, thereby promoting deterrence. 4' Like retributivists, many deterrence theorists advocating determinate sentenc-

ing required proportionality between the degree of punishment
42
inflicted and the severity of the offense.

32. M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 100.
33. See Morris, supra note 31, at 1168-69.
34. See TASK FORCE REPORT 13; A. VON HIRSCH 28.
35.

TASK FORCE REPORT 13.

36. "Grotesque disparities are revealed in the sentences imposed for the same classes of offenders in one state as compared to another state, by different courts within the same jurisdiction,
and even by individual judges meting out punishment to different offenders." Id. 4-5. Seealso A.
VON HIRSCH 12, 29.

37. See note 17 supra.
38. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supranote 4, at 93. One of the major factors contributing to inmates' discontent at the time of the 1971 Attica uprising was the uncertainty concerning
release dates, which resulted from sentence indeterminacy. N.Y. SPECIAL COMM'N ON ATTICA,
ATrICA 91-102 (1972). See also A. VON HIRSCH 29, 31.
39. The "rehabilitative ideal" characterizes the use of sentencing dispositions to reduce crime
by isolating and rehabilitating offenders.
40.

See generally A. VON HIRSCH.

41. See E. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 2, at 133-36; J. WILSON, supra note 5, at 162-82.
42. See, e.g., van den Haag, supra note 5,at 149-50, 195. The proportionality principle is also
expressed in classical deterrence theories: "Venture more against a great offense than a small
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Proposed determinate sentencing schemes have taken two forms:

presumptive sentencing and mandatory sentencing. Under presumptive sentencing, statutes classify crimes according to seriousness and assign to each category a fixed, presumptively proper, sentence. That

sentence must be imposed upon each convicted offender, except that
the sentencing authority is allowed-within specified limits or percent-

ages-to reduce or enhance the presumptive sentence if aggravating or
mitigating circumstances are present. 43 Discretionary release through
parole or suspension of sentence is abolished, and the offender serves
the entire term, subject perhaps to "good time" reductions necessary to

maintain prison discipline.44
Unlike presumptive systems, pure mandatory models 45 permit no
deviation from the fixed penalty even if "aggravating or mitigating"
circumstances exist. As with presumptive sentencing, the offender is
required to serve the full sentence without the possibility of discretion-

ary parole release, suspension of the sentence, or probation, but with

some deviations from the fixed sentences for "good time" permitted. 46
Variants of mandatory sentencing require the offender to serve a mini-

mum statutory term without the possibility of lesser punishment or discretionary release, but permit judicial discretion to impose, up to a
statutory maximum, a sentence exceeding the prescribed minimum
47
term.
Legislatures in several states have recently enacted presumptive
sentencing systems.4 8 Although systematic use of mandatory sentencing is nowhere reflected in current practice, 49 such schemes are being

considered.50 Moreover, many state criminal codes require mandatory

sentencing for particular crimes (most often drug and weapons of5
fenses) and for habitual criminality. '
one. . . . The greater the mischief of the offense, the greater is the expense, which it may be
worthwhile to be at, in the way of punishment." Bentham, The UtilitarianTheory ofPunishment,
in PUNISHMENT 25, 29 (J. Feinberg & H. Gross eds. 1975).
43. See TASK FORCE REPORT 40-48; A. VON HIRSCH 99-101.
44. See A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN 41-45. To insure that sentences are indeed fixed,
and that inmates at all times know the actual length of their sentences, advocates of determinate
sentencing urge that "good time" systems, if adopted at all, be carefully detailed through specific
guidelines defining how much good time may be gained or lost and for what behavior. Id.
45. For a discussion of mandatory or "flat time" sentencing, see TASK FORCE REPORT 16-17.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See note 7 supra.
49. See note 7 supra.
50. In his 1975 Message to Contgress on Crime, then President Ford perhaps tacitly approved
mandatory sentencing in suggesting that "it may be time to give serious study to the concept of socalled 'flat-time sentencing' in the Federal Law." Quoted in TASK FORCE REPORT 16.
51. See note 7 supra.
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The Problems of Excessive Punishment

Because of its emphasis on proportioning punishment to the gravity of the offense, 52 determinate sentencing encounters two problems
that must be solved if punishment is to be justly and coherently administered: proportioning punishment to victim harm,5 3 and proportioning
punishment to offender fault.5 4 The problem of proportioning punish-

ment to victim harm already exists in some penal systems. For example, several states mandate life imprisonment for a person convicted of

his third felony regardless of the nature of the felonies.55 In those states
offenders can commit three minor, non-violent, property offenses and
receive the same punishment they would have received had they committed rape or murder.5 6 A state arguably encounters similar problems
of punishment disproportionate to victim harm when it imposes pun57
ishment far more severe than other states impose for the same offense.
Fixing punishment for a particular offense or for habitual criminal sta-

tus58 without regard to the special circumstances of individual cases
also risks the possibility of punishment disproportionate to offender

fault.5 9 Although this possibility is particularly likely under mandatory
sentencing systems, it also arises under presumptive sentencing systems
that too narrowly constrict the instances in which individual circum-

stances may be considered,60 or that define the mitigating factors too
52. See van den Haag, supra note 5, at 191-95.
53. This Article does not address the problems of criminal punishment as they relate to socalled "victimless crimes."
54. Bedau, supra note 14, at 67. The problems are less serious with indeterminate sentencing
systems. First, because indeterminate sentencing is based on rehabilitating and incapacitating
offenders, relating severity of punishment to the seriousness of offenses is unnecessary. Second, to
the extent that proportionality is desirable in indeterminate systems, it tends to be a natural byproduct of the discretion granted to sentencing authorities who are thoroughly familiar with the
facts of the case. See notes 17-19 supra and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974).
56. This is, of course, precisely what happened in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 160-63 infra.
57. See, e.g., In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974), in which the
offender successfully attacked a ten-year mandatory sentence imposed on second offenders because, inter alia,the sentence was excessive when compared with sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for second narcotics convictions.
58. Punishment for a "status" offense is constitutionally permissible. Spencer v. Texas, 385
U.S. 554 (1967); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
59. Sentences proportioned to offender fault require allowance for individualization of
sentences, "for [such sentences] condemn not only the wrong done, the offending act, but also the
wrongdoer, the offender." Golding, CriminalSentencing: Some PhilosophicalConsiderations,in
JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 14, at 102.
60. The need for precision in defining what constitutes aggravating and mitigating circumstances is illustrated by the following example:
In a single term five defendants appear before the court charged with kidnapping. No. I
is a woman whose baby died, and who took another woman's baby from the hospital.
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narrowly 6' or the aggravating factors too broadly.62
II.

PRE-RUMMEL EIGHTH AMENDMENT CASES

Increasingly, the courts have viewed the punishment problems discussed above as matters within the scope of the cruel-and-unusual-pun63
ishments clause of the eighth amendment. As discussed below,
several state and lower federal courts, relying on Supreme Court cases

construing the eighth amendment, had found legislatively set punishments unconstitutionally excessive because they were disproportionate
to victim harm and offender fault. But just when the increasing use of

determinate sentencing now makes this form of judicial review most
desirable, the Supreme Court in Rummel v. Estelle64 has sharply undercut reliance on the eighth amendment as a means of constraining excessive punishment in non-capital cases. Because the case law preceding
Rummel was effective in limiting excessive punishment, and because
Rummel itself departed so abruptly from that case law, a review of the
cases preceding Rummel will be instructive.
A.

Supreme Court Cases.
The Supreme Court traditionally viewed the eighth amendment's

proscription of cruel and unusual punishments as prohibiting only
the imposition of certain kinds rather than degrees of punishment.
Thus, in the nineteenth-century cases of Wilkerson v. Utah65 and In re
No. 2 is a young man whose girlfriend said she was breaking up with him. He put her in
a car and drove her around for 24 hours trying to persuade her to change her mind,
while her frantic parents tried to locate them and the girl did everything she could to get
away. No. 3 is a divorced man who took his own child from its mother who had legal
custody and refused to tell the mother where the child was. No. 4 is a kidnapper for
ransom who kept a young woman buried in a box fitted with air tubes for breathing in
order to make it impossible for searchers to find her, and who demanded $200,000 from
her wealthy father. No. 5 is a woman accomplice of the kidnapper for ransom. She
assisted in the kidnapping because she was in love with the kidnapper and was also
threatened by him. She did everything she could to keep the kidnapped girl alive when
it was impossible for her to do so.
The offenses charged are identical: kidnapping. How should they be disposed of?
Golding, supra note 59, at 93-94.
61. Failure to take into consideration all matters touching on culpability may result in unjustly harsh sentences. See id. See also notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text.
62. Characteristics such as the defendant's race, appearance, and sex are clearly inappropriate as aggravating conditions of offender fault. Others such as the offender's failure to plead
guilty, cooperate with authorities, or be contrite are more troublesome. See TASK FORCE REPORT
42-44. In any event, sentences in excess of the presumptive term that are premised on inappropriate aggravating conditions are disproportionate to offender fault.
63. See text accompanying notes 118-55 infra.
64. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
65. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
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Kemmler,66 the Court confined its analysis to the constitutionality of
the particular modes of punishment imposed in those cases-execution
by shooting and execution by electricity. Although the Court recognized the difficulty of precisely defining the reach of the cruel-and-unusual-punishments clause, it affirmed that the eighth amendment forbids
punishments of torture or punishments that bring about a lingering
67
death.
1. Non-CapitalPunishment Cases. In 1910, however, in Weems v.
United States,68 the Court first suggested that punishments could be
unconstitutional because of their duration alone. The punishment at
issue-cadenatemporal69-was imposed in the Philippines for the falsification of public documents. Cadena temporal included a minimum
sentence of twelve years and one day, in chains, at "hard and painful
labor"; the loss of many civil rights; and lifetime surveillance. 70 While
acknowledging the possibility that the punishment included "the cruelty of pain" 7 ' and that the eighth amendment prohibits "inhuman and
barbarous" modes of punishment, 72 the Court broadened its prior
eighth amendment analysis by finding that an otherwise acceptable
sentence can be so disproportionate to the offense for which it is imposed as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 73 In applying this
proportionality principle to the punishment of cadena temporal, the
Court first compared the punishment with that prescribed for the same
offense in the United States and found the Philippine punishment to be
much more severe. 74 Next, the Court compared the challenged punishment with the punishment prescribed in the Philippines for forging or
counterfeiting obligations or securities and found that the maximum
punishment for that more serious offense was no greater than that im66. 136 U.S. 436 (1889).
67. Id. at 447; Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. at 135.
68. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
69. Cadena temporal is Spanish for "temporary chain."
70. 217 U.S. at 364-65. The petitioner, a United States government officer, was convicted of
falsifying two items on a public document and was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment plus
the additional penalties. Id. at 362-63. The Court chose not to review the punishment as applied,
but rather focused its analysis on "the minimum degree of the law, for it is with the law that we
are most concerned." Id. at 366.
71. Id. at 366.
72. Id. at 368. In reference to the Court's similar language in In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,
447 (1890), the Weems Court stated, "It was not meant in the language we have quoted to give a
comprehensive definition of cruel and unusual punishment, but only to explain the application of
the provision to the punishment of death." 217 U.S. at 370-71.
73. 217 U.S. at 367.

74. Id. at 380.
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posed for the falsification of a single item of a public document. 75 The
Court found these anomalies to be more than mere exercises of legislative judgment. Rather, they were evidence that the punishment was
cruel and unusual. 76 Cadena temporal was found, in short, to be unconstitutional "both on account of [its] degree and kind." 77 Weems

thus established a two-part analysis of punishments: a comparison of
the punishment at issue first with the punishment imposed for the same

offense in other jurisdictions, and second with that imposed for other

78
offenses in the same jurisdiction.
The Weems Court's use of proportionality analysis, and the lan-

guage of the opinion itself, suggested that a sentence could, solely because of its length, be so disproportionate to a particular crime as to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.7 9 Lower courts later interpreted Weems in this manner in holding certain prison sentences unconstitutionally excessive.80
The Supreme Court did not allude to the proportionality doctrine

again until the 1958 decision of Trop v. Dulles,81 which held that denationalization is an unconstitutional punishment for the crime of wartime desertion. Proportionality was not the basis for the holding,
however: "Since wartime desertion [can be punished] by death, there
75. Id. at 380-81.
76. In other words, the highest punishment possible for a crime which may cause the loss
of many thousand[s] of dollars, and to prevent which the duty of the State should be as
eager as to prevent the perversion of truth in a public document, is not greater than that
which may be imposed for falsifying a single item of a public account. . . . [Tihis contrast. . . condemns the sentence in this case as cruel and unusual.
Id. at 381.
77. Id. at 377 (emphasis added).
78. The Weems Court also considered the nature of the offense itself to be relevant to the
cruelty of the punishment, noting twice that one could be convicted of document falsification even
without realizing any gain or injuring anyone. Id. at 363, 365. This facet of the analysis has not,
however, been emphasized in cases following Weems.
79. After Weems the Court in Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912), upheld a
mandatory life sentence imposed under West Virginia's recidivist statute, noting: "Nor can it be
maintained that cruel and unusual punishment has been inflicted." Id. at 631. At the time of this
decision, however, the eighth amendment had not been held applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Furthermore, the GrahamCourt considered the defendant to be challenging the validity of the recidivist legislation and the proceedings that it authorized rather than the
proportionality of the sentence imposed. See id. at 623.
Four years later in Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916), the Court upheld concurrent sentences of five years' imprisonment and cumulative fines of $1,000 on each of seven counts
of placing letters in the mail for the purpose of executing a single scheme to defraud, stating only:
"[T]here is no ground for declaring the punishment unconstitutional." Id. at 394. Badders, like
Graham, was heard long before the eighth amendment was applied to the states in Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
80. See note 121 infra and accompanying text. See also People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167,
171-79, 194 N.W.2d 827, 829-33 (1972).
81. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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can be no argument that the penalty of denationalization is excessive in
relation to the gravity of the crime."'8 2 The Court articulated a policy
basis for eighth amendment analysis: "The basic concept underlying
the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While
the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that
this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards. '8 3 Although the Court did not dispose of Trop on disproportionality
grounds, it did use the interjurisdictional analysis applied in Weems in
finding that only two of eighty-four nations of the world imposed dena84
tionalization as a punishment for desertion.
Four years after Trop, in Robinson v. California8 5 the Supreme
Court for the first time directly applied the eighth amendment's crueland-unusual-punishments clause to a state-imposed punishment. The
Court held unconstitutional a California statute that made the status of
narcotics addiction a criminal offense punishable by incarceration for
ninety days in the county jail.8 6 "To be sure," said the Court, "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is
either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be considered in the
abstract. Even one day in prison would be cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."8 7 The eighth amendment underpinnings of the Robinson holding are uncertain; although it
is clear from the quoted language that the Court was not holding imprisonment as a mode of punishment to be cruel and unusual,88 it is not
clear that the Court was relying on the disproportionality doctrine to
strike down the statute. 89 Because Robinson is a problematic eighth
amendment case, its relevance to the proportionality doctrine is questionable. 9 0
82. Id. at 99.
83. Id. at 100.
84. Id. at 103.
85. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
86. Id. at 667.
87. Id.
88. The defense had argued that imprisonment of the drug addict would be cruel and unusual because it would impose "intense mental and physical torment and suffering; via the 'coldturkey' withdrawal method." Brief for Appellant at 30, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962).
89. The Court did not even cite the Weems opinion, but rather cited Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459 (1947), which held that executing a defendant by electrocution after an earlier attempt at
electrocution had failed because of mechanical difficulty was not cruel and unusual Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. at 666. Because Francis focused on the mode of punishment and not its
proportionality to the crime, 329 U.S. at 464, the Robinson Court's holding was presumably not
based on the proportionality doctrine.
90. Mr. Justice White's dissenting opinion suggested that the true ground of Robinson was a
resurrected form of substantive due process:
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2. CapitalPunishmentCases. After Robinson, in a series-of death
penalty cases, 9' the Court took the opportunity to develop more fully
the disproportionality analysis originated in Weems. In Furman v.
Georgia92 the Court held that the eighth amendment prohibited the
infliction of capital punishment under virtually all the state statutes
then in force. 93 All nine Justices wrote separate opinions, with a majority citing Weems for the proposition that the eighth amendment pro94
hibits excessive as well as inherently cruel punishments.
Similarly, in Gregg v. Georgia,95 which held the punishment of
death not to be per se unconstitutional for the crime of murder,96 a
three-justice plurality of the Court found the excessiveness as well as
the barbarity of punishment to be crucial to eighth amendment inquiry.
In articulating the considerations relevant to review under the amendment, the plurality noted that society's attitude towards a challenged
sanction--determined by objective criteria such as the history and
traditional use of the punishment, 97 current legislative trends regarding
its use, 98 and its frequency of imposition by juries 99-is a significant
indicator of the punishment's cruelty. t°° Public perceptions regarding
a punishment are not conclusive, 10 however, for the penalty must also
accord with "the dignity of man"-the basic concept underlying the
I deem this application of "cruel and unusual punishment" so novel that I suspect the
Court was hard put to find a way to ascribe to the Framers of the Constitution the result
reached today rather than to its own notions of ordered liberty. If this case involved

economic regulation, the present Court's allergy to substantive due process would surely
save the statute and prevent the court from imposing its own philosophical predilections
upon state legislatures or Congress.
370 U.S. at 689 (White, J., dissenting). See also 29 BROOKLYN L. REv. 139, 141 (1962).
91. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffit v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972).
92. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
93. Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White found it unconstitutional under the eighth amendment to leave the imposition of the death penalty to the untrammeled discretion of judges or
juries. Id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 314 (White,
J., concurring). Justices Brennan and Marshall held that the imposition of the death penalty is
constitutionally impermissible per se. Id.at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 370 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
94. See 408 U.S. at 266, 280 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 325 (Marshall, J., concurring);
Id. at 456-57 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun, J., and Rehnquist, J.).
95. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
96. Id. at 169.
97. Id. at 176-79.
98. Id. at 179-81.
99. Id. at 181-82.
100. Id. at 173.
101. Id.
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eighth amendment. 102 "This means, at least, that the punishment may
not be 'excessive'. . . . First, the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, the punishment must
03
not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime."'
In Woodson v. North Carolina' 4 the Court held unconstitutional a
statute that mandated the death penalty for persons convicted of murder.10 5 A plurality of the Court, in applying the objective indicators set
forth in Gregg, assessed as follows the contemporary sentiment regarding mandatory death penalties: "The belief no longer prevails that
every offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment
without regard to the past life and habits of a particular offender. [T]he
death sentence [is no longer] an automatic and commonplace result of
convictions .... ,,106 Regarding Gregg's "dignity of man" concept,
the plurality stated:
While the prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing determinations generally reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a
constitutional imperative, we believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment, ...
requires consideration of the character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death. 107
102. Id.
103. Id. "Although we cannot 'invalidate a category of penalties because we deem less severe
penalties adequate to serve the ends of penology,'. . . the sanction imposed cannot be so totally
without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of punishment." Id. at
182-83 (citation omitted). The plurality identified retribution and deterrence as the penological
purposes underlying the death penalty. Id. at 183. In the past the Justices had differed sharply
over the role of retribution in capital cases. Compare Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 344-45
(1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("To preserve the integrity of the Eighth Amendment, the Court
has consistently denigrated retribution as a permissible goal of punishment.. . . [r]he Eighth
Amendment is our insulation from our baser selves") with id. at 394 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
("There is no authority suggesting that the Eighth Amendment was intended to purge the law of
its retributive elements, and the Court has consistently assumed that retribution is a legitimate
dimension of the punishment of crimes") andid at 453 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("While retribution

alone may seem an unworthy justification in a moral sense, its utility in a system of criminal
justice requiring public support has long been recognized"). See also Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241, 248 (1949) ("Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence").
104. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
105. Id. at 305. See also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (holding unconstitutional
the mandatory death penalty for five narrowly defined categories of first-degree murder).
106. 428 U.S. at 296-97 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949), which held
that the due process clause did not prevent the sentencing judge from considering information
from out-of-court sources in determining the kind and extent of punishment to impose).
107. 428 U.S. at 304 (citations omitted). The Court cited Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v.
Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937), for the proposition that "[flor the determination of sentences, justice
generally requires consideration of more than the particular acts by which the crime was commit-
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The Court emphasized the distinction between capital and non-capital
offenses by stating that its conclusion rested "squarely on the predicate
different from a sentence of
that the penalty of death is qualitatively
08
imprisonment, however long."'
Although the Court held the death penalty not to be disproportionate to the crime of murder in Gregg,'0 9 a four-justice plurality in
Coker v. Georgia" cited Weems as support for the view that "the
Eighth Amendment bars not only those punishments that are 'barbaric'
but also those that are 'excessive' in relation to the crime committed," I l and held the capital sanction to be "grossly disproportionate
and excessive punishment for the crime of rape."' l2 In so holding, the
Coker plurality assessed the seriousness of rape as compared to murder. "Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment, but in
terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the
murder, which does involve the unjuspublic, it does not compare with
3
tified taking of human life.""1
The effects of these Supreme Court death penalty cases on the proportionality doctrine developed in Weems is not clear. Furman, Gregg,
and Woodson seem to require, at the very least, that before the death
penalty can be constitutionally imposed, the sentencing authority must
consider the character and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the particular offense."14 Moreover, the "excessiveness" test spelled out in Gregg and Coker seems to focus on victim
harm, requiring that an imposed punishment be proportionate to the
severity of the crime."s Whether these sentencing criteria are constitutionally mandated in non-capital cases was not made clear, because in
each of the capital cases the Court emphasized the uniqueness of the
death penalty for purposes of eighth amendment analysis."t 6 Nevertheless, the analytical tools developed in the capital cases appear equally
ted and that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender." 428 U.S. at 304.
108. 428 U.S. at 305.
109. 428 U.S. at 169.
110. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
111. Id.at 592.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 598.
114. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 303-04.
115. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 592; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173.

116. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 598 (the death penalty is unique in its severity and irrevocability); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 305 (the death penalty is "qualitatively different
from a sentence of imprisonment, however long"); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 187 ("[t]here is
no question that death is unique in its severity and irrevocability"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring) (the death penalty "differs from all other forms of criminal punishment").
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useful for non-capital cases; indeed, Weems's two-pronged analysis" 7
itself provides a sufficiently objective standard by which to assess the

proportionality of a non-capital sentence to the seriousness of its underlying offense.
B.

State and Lower FederalCourt Cases.

Even before the Supreme Court death penalty cases, lower courts,
relying on Weems, were deciding excessive punishment cases by assess-

ing the proportionality of prison sentences not only as they related to
offenses in the abstract, but also as applied to the circumstances of par-

ticular offenders. The California Supreme Court in In re Lynch,118 for
example, addressed the question whether an indeterminate sentence for

a second conviction for indecent exposure-a conviction potentially
amounting to life imprisonment because no maximum term is imposed' 9 -- constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under California's
constitution. 20 Drawing heavily from Weems, the court articulated
three distinct standards for determining whether a punishment "is so
disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the
conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.' 12'
The first standard called for an examination of the seriousness of the
offense and the culpability of the offender. 22 The circumstances of the
crime in question, the degree of violence inherent in the offense, and

any rational gradations of culpability that can be made on the basis of
injury to the victim were all considered relevant to the evaluation of
seriousness. 123 The second and third standards essentially followed the
117. See text accompanying notes 74-78 supra. Weems is also cited for the principle that a
punishment is excessive if it fails to serve a penological purpose. See Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173.
118. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
119. Id. at 419, 503 P.2d at 927, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
120. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 6. California prohibits "cruel or unusual punishment," a logically
different formulation from the federal prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. This difference, however, was not significant to the Lynch court.
121. 8 Cal. 3d at 424, 503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226. The court noted that the proportionality doctrine had been adopted at the federal level in Weems: "Although undoubtedly influenced by the peculiar penalties imposed in addition to imprisonment, the court did not hold the
law unconstitutional merely on the ground of the bizarre method of punishment." id. at 421, 503
P.2d at 928, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
122. Id. at 425, 503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
123. Id. at 425-26, 503 P.2d at 930-31, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27. The Lynch court noted that
the Weeras Court had emphasized the minor nature of the offense before it: "[T]he opinion twice
notes that the amount of cash which the defendant was convicted of falsely claiming as a government expenditure was only a few hundred pesos, and twice underscores that an offender may 'gain
nothing' from this crime and 'injure nobody'." Id. at 425, 503 P.2d at 931, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 227
(citations omitted).
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two prongs of the Weems proportionality test: a comparison of the

challenged punishment with punishments imposed within the same jurisdiction for other offenses' 24 and a comparison of the challenged punishment with punishments prescribed in other jurisdictions for the same
offense.

25

In applying this three-part analysis to the defendant's potential life
sentence, the Lynch court found that the nonviolent nature of the offense, 26 the lesser penalties prescribed in California for more serious
crimes, 127 the lack of enhanced punishments for repetition of most

other crimes, 128 the short jail sentences and fines imposed by other
states for initial and subsequent indecent exposure offenses, 129 and the
failure of the punishment to fit the defendant and the circumstances of

his offense

30

rendered the sentence unconstitutionally disproportionate

3
to the offender's fault and the offense's harm.' '
Two years after Lynch the California Supreme Court in In re

Foss 32 applied the Lynch formula to strike down a statutory provision 33 imposing a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years upon an
offender convicted of a second drug-related felony. The defendant
Foss, a heroin addict suffering from withdrawal, on five separate occasions acquired heroin for Holmes, a fellow drug addict who claimed he

was going through withdrawal. Foss, who had never sold drugs for
profit, received as consideration a single fix of heroin on three of the
five occasions. 34 Foss was convicted on five counts of selling or furnishing heroin; because he had been convicted fourteen years before of

possession of heroin, he was sentenced to a mandatory minimum term
of ten years with a maximum of life.

35

Foss challenged the statute

under the California constitution's cruel-or-unusual-punishment
36

clause. 1

In applying the Lynch standards, the Foss court looked not only to
the nature of the offense and the offender, but also to the penological
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
L.A. L.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 426, 503 P.2d at 931, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
Id. at 427, 503 P.2d at 932, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
Id. at 430, 503 P.2d at 934, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
Id. at 431, 503 P.2d at 935, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
Id. at 434, 503 P.2d at 937, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
Id. at 436, 503 P.2d at 938-39, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
Id. at 437, 503 P.2d at 939, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
Id. at 439, 503 P.2d at 940, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 236. For an analysis of Lynch see 6 Loy.
REv. 416 (1973).
10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974).
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352 (West Supp. 1980).
10 Cal. 3d at 918, 519 P.2d at 1077, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
Id. at 915-16, 519 P.2d at 1075-76, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 651-52.
Id. at 917-18, 519 P.2d at 1077, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
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purposes of the punishment in light of the particular offense. 137 The

court first noted that enhanced sentences for repeated narcotics offenses
should be based on the particular circumstances of the offenses, such as

the quantity of narcotics involved and whether the transactions were
those of an addict supporting his habit or were instead sales for
profit.' 38 The court concluded that the mandatory minimum sentence
as applied to the defendant was disproportionate to his degree of fault
because the statute failed to allow for the offender's particular circumstances.' 39 Moreover, because rehabilitation of the offender was the
statute's primary goal, 140 the court found that the statute's preclusion of
parole consideration for ten years was clearly excessive, because Foss
might well have been rehabilitated before ten years.' 4' The second and

third of the Lynch standards

42

also required a finding of unconstitu-

tionality under the state constitution: the mandatory sentence was unusually severe as compared both to recidivist sentences imposed in

California for more serious offenses

43 and

to minimum terms imposed

44
in other states for second narcotics convictions.
Although Lynch and Foss were decided on state constitutional
grounds, their clear Weems pedigree suggests that those state courts
would have reached the same results had they directly applied the

eighth amendment. Lynch and Foss thus show that proportioning punishment to offender fault as well as to victim harm not only is judicially
possible, but also might be found constitutionally necessary under the
eighth amendment. Mandatory sentences are especially suspect be-

cause they prevent the consideration of particular circumstances necessary to a just imposition of punishment. California cases subsequent to
Foss have limited its holding to sentences imposed on recidivists.'45
The Foss court has not been alone in finding certain mandatory
137. Id. at 923, 519 P.2d at 1081, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
138. Id.at 921, 519 P.2d at 1080, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 655.
139. Id. at 923, 519 P.2d at 1081, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 924, 519 P.2d at 1081, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
142. See text accompanying notes 124-25 supra.
143. 10 Cal. 3d at 925, 519 P.2d at 1082, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 658.
144. Id. at 928, 519 P.2d at 1084, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 660. Justice Clark dissented on the ground
that the sentencing judge could have exercised his inherent power to strike the prior conviction
had mitigating circumstances led him to believe that the interests of justice would have been
furthered by not subjecting the defendant to the recidivist provisions of the statute. Id. at 933-34,
519 P.2d at 1088, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 664 (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Clark's
opinion suggests that sentencing discretion was necessary to the constitutionality of the recidivist
statute.
For a discussion of the Foss case, see 20 N.Y.L.F. 655 (1975); 63 CAL. L. Rav. 289 (1975).
145. The California Supreme Court in In re Grant, 18 Cal. 3d 1, 13, 553 P.2d 590, 598, 132
Cal. Rptr. 430, 438 (1976) noted:
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prison sentences to be cruel and unusual.' 46 The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in Hartv. Coiner,147 applying an eighth amendment
analysis very similar to that used in Lynch and Foss under California's
Provisions which preclude parole consideration for specified periods become disproportionate to the offense when they not only indiscriminately penalize repeatedconduct of
widely varying gravity without regard for regularly recurring mitigating factors, but also
absolutely precludeparoleforsubstantiallengths of time in excess of that reasonably calculated to allow for consideration of rehabilitative progress or to fulfill other legitimate
penological objectives.
(emphasis added). The Grantcourt specifically reserved opinion as to mandatory minimum-term
provisions for first offenders. Id. at 13 n.10, 553 P.2d at 598 n.10, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 438 n.10. The
California appellate courts have upheld mandatory minimum term provisions for first offenders.
See People v. Waters, 52 Cal. App. 3d 323, 125 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1975) (upholding a three-year
mandatory minimum term for conviction of conspiracy to sell and the sale of a controlled substance); People v. Carbonie, 48 Cal. App. 3d 679, 121 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1975) (upholding a five-year
mandatory minimum term for using a minor as an agent to furnish a controlled substance); People
v. Serna, 44 Cal. App. 3d 717, 118 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1975) (upholding a three-year mandatory minimum term for the sale of heroin). But c. People v. Vargas, 53 Cal. App. 3d 516, 126 Cal. Rptr. 88
(1975) (holding a three-year mandatory term for furnishing a controlled substance unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who had a minimum criminal record, was not a major offender or
dangerous character, was not a drug user, and had furnished only a small amount of a nonaddictive substance from which no harm actually resulted).
146. For example, the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Workman v. Commonwealth, 429
S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968), held unconstitutional a mandatory life sentence for the crime of rape as
applied to a fourteen-year-old. The court applied three tests in judging the sentence's constitutionality: whether in view of all the circumstances the punishment shocked the conscience,
whether the punishment was disproportionate to the offense, and whether the punishment exceeded what was necessary to achieve any legitimate aim. Id. at 378. The court found that the
intent of the legislature in imposing the punishment was to deal with dangerous and incorrigible
offenders who would be a constant threat to society, and that it was impossible to predict that a
fourteen-year-old would remain incorrigible for the rest of his life. Id.
In People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972), the Michigan Supreme Court
held unconstitutional a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years for the offense of selling
marijuana. In determining the proportionality between the punishment and the offense, the court
first applied the two-pronged comparative test set forth in Weens. The court then looked to the
penological considerations underlying indeterminate sentencing, finding that rehabilitation, the
primary goal, was best achieved by short, indeterminate sentences. The court concluded that "[a]
compulsory prison sentence of 20 years for a non-violent crime imposed without consideration for
defendant's individual personality and history is so excessive that it 'shocks the conscience.'" Id.
at 181, 194 N.W.2d at 834. See also State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 245 P.2d 788 (1952), in which the
court avoided holding unconstitutional a statute that apparently mandated life imprisonment for
the crime of committing lewd and lascivious acts upon a female child by construing the statute to
permit the sentencing judge to fix a maximum sentence that could be less than life.
Other state courts, accepting the validity of the, Weenzr proportionality doctrine, have applied
objective standards such as those used in Foss and have found the challenged mandatory sentence
not to be disproportionate to the crime committed. See State v. Freeman, 223 Kan. 362, 574 P.2d
950 (1978) (upholding a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for committing murder with a
firearm); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 344 N.E.2d 166 (Mass. 1976) (upholding a mandatory minimum sentence of one year for a first conviction of carrying a firearm without a license); People v.
Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 332 N.E.2d 338, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471 (upholding a mandatory life sentence
for the sale of heroin or cocaine), cert. denied,423 U.S. 950 (1975); State v. Lee, 87 Wash. 2d 932,
558 P.2d 236 (1977) (upholding a mandatory life sentence imposed under a habitual criminal
statute upon commission of the third felony).
147. 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974).
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constitution, held unconstitutional a mandatory life sentence imposed,
under West Virginia's habitual criminal statute, 48 on an offender convicted of perjury, writing a $150 check on insufficient funds, and transporting across state lines forged checks totalling $140. The Hart court
relied upon four criteria to determine the disproportionality of the sentence: (1) the nature and gravity of the offense; (2) the legislative purpose behind the punishment; (3) a comparison of how the defendant
would have been punished in other jurisdictions; and (4) a comparison
of punishments imposed in the same jurisdiction for more serious
crimes. 49 In assessing the nature and gravity of the offense, the court
looked to the specific facts surrounding the defendant's underlying offenses, noting that they were nonviolent, that the bad check offense was
nearly a misdemeanor,150 and that the perjury conviction, though more
serious than the other offenses, was mitigated somewhat because the
defendant had been forced to choose between family loyalty and his
duty to be truthful.' 5 ' As to the legislative purpose of the punishment-deterring others and protecting society-the court found that
life imprisonment (the most severe punishment possible under West
Virginia law) was not necessary to protect society or to deter others
from committing the crimes the defendant had committed. 52 The
comparative analyses under the third and fourth criteria also showed
the imposed punishment to be unconstitutionally severe.' 5 3 The Hart
court concluded that the mandatory life sentence was in this case
"wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offenses he committed,
54
and not necessary to achieve any legitimate legislative purpose."'
148. W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (1966). The defendant did not attack the statute itself but contended that the mandatory life sentence was disproportionate as applied to the underlying offense.
483 F.2d at 139.
149. 483 F.2d at 140-42.
150. "[O]ne penny less in the face amount of the check and the offense would have been a fiveto-sixty day petty misdemeanor." Id. at 141.
151. Id. at 140-41.
152. Id. at 141. In its analysis of legislative purpose, the court relied upon Justice Brennan's
observation in Furmanthat a punishment is unnecessary and excessive if a significantly less severe
punishment would achieve the same purpose. Id. Justice Brennan's view was later rejected in
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 182-83.
153. 483 F.2d at 141-42.
154. Id. at 143. The Hart decision should be compared with Griffin v. Warden, 519 F.2d 756,
757 (4th Cir. 1975), which upheld a mandatory life sentence imposed upon a defendant convicted
of grand larceny, burglary, and breaking and entering, all within a six-year period, because the
crimes were "serious offenses that clearly involve the potentiality of violence and danger to life as
well as to property."
In Davis v. Davis, 601 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1979) (en bane), vacated and remandedsub nom.
Hutto v. Davis, 100 S.Ct. 1593 (1980) (remanded for further consideration in light of Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980)), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held unconstitutional a
sentence of forty years' imprisonment and a $20,000 fine for possession and distribution of less
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The willingness of lower courts to examine prison sentences under
the analysis emerging from Weems and Lynch has not resulted in frequent findings of excessive punishment. Indeed, cases like Lynch, Foss,

and Hart are extremely rare even though the courts are constantly petitioned to overturn allegedly excessive sentences.1 55 The lower appel-

late courts have cautiously applied proportionality analysis to prison
sentences, routinely deferring to legislative and sentencing-court decisions regarding the appropriate degrees of punishment for given offenses and offenders. That sentences are rarely overturned as excessive,
however, in no way lessens the necessity of judicial review as a check
on unduly harsh punishments. Furthermore, because Weems, Foss,

and Hart all involved determinate sentences, they prominently demonstrate the usefulness of a judicial safety valve as the movement toward
determinate sentencing gathers steam.
III.

RUMMEL

v

ESTELLE

California 56

Although Robinson v.
touched off the review of sev57
eral state-imposed prison sentences,
the Supreme Court did not comment further on the appropriateness of the amendment as a measure of

proportionality of punishment in non-capital cases.' 5 8 The Court recently broke its silence, however, in Rummel v. Estelle, 59 a case that

dramatically highlights the problems of proportioning punishment to
offender fault and victim harm under systems of mandatory sentencing.
A.

The Holding and Rationale of Rummel.

In Rummel a five-to-four majority of the Court upheld a
mandatory life sentence imposed on the petitioner, whose three felonies

over a nine year period-for fraudulently presenting a credit card with
intent to obtain approximately $80, passing a forged instrument in the
amount of $28.36, and obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses-triggered
than nine ounces of marijuana. The Davis holding makes it apparent that Hart was not limited to

cases involving life sentences.
155. See note 146 supra and the cases cited and discussed in Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 335 (1970).
Indeed, Justice Rehnquist himself in Rummel noted this rarity, 445 U.S. at 272, as if that were a
reason for finding a particular punishment not to be excessive.
156. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Robinson established the applicability of the eighth amendment's
cruel-and-unusual-punishment clause to the states. See text accompanying notes 85-90 supra.
157. See, e.g., Perkins v. North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.C. 1964); Faulkner v.
State, 445 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1968); State v. Espinosa, 101 Ariz. 474, 421 P.2d 322 (1966); State v.
Nance, 20 Utah 2d 372, 438 P.2d 542 (1968).
158. "[S]ince Weems was decided in 1910, there has been no opinion in the Supreme Court
which has struck down a noncapital punishment on proportionality grounds." Mulligan, Cruel
and Unusual Punishments: The .Proportionaliy Rule, 47 FoRDHAM L. REv. 639, 644 (1979).
159. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
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the application of Texas's habitual criminal statute.160 By downplaying
the applicability of the proportionality doctrine for assessing lengths of
sentences,'61 and giving the utmost respect to the principle of federal-

ism,' 62 the majority opinion by Mr. Justice Rehnquist found that petitioner Rummers sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual
163
punishment.
The Rummel Court did not wholly reject the eighth amendment
proportionality doctrine,' 64 but did severely restrict its applicability to

cases challenging the length of sentences. First, the Court declined to
follow the analysis formulated in the death penalty cases, by finding
those cases to be of "limited assistance" because of the unique nature of
the penalty involved. 165 Second, the Court refused to interpret Weems
as holding that in a non-capital case a prison sentence could, solely
because of its length, be so disproportionate to the underlying crime as
to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 66 Rather, the Court
found the Weems holding to be based upon facts peculiar to that case:
"the triviality of the charged offense, the impressive length of the minimum term of imprisonment, and the extraordinary nature of the 'accessories,'" which included chains, hard labor, and the loss of basic civil

rights. 167 The Court completed its narrowing of Weems by noting that
"one could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this
Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies
. . .the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of

160. TEx. PENAL CODE art. 63 (1925): "Whoever shall have been three times convicted of a
felony less than capital shall on such third conviction be imprisoned for life in the penitentiary."
The 1974 Penal Code preserved art. 63, with minor variation. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3,
§ 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974).
161. 445 U.S. at 272-76.
162. Id. at 282-84.
163. Id. at 285.
164. "This Court has on occasion stated that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of a
sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime." Id. at 271.
165. Id. at 272.
166. Id. at 272-73.
167. Id. at 274. This reading of Weems appears to be inconsistent with the Court's prior
understanding of the case as stated in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 171:
Although the [ Weems] Court acknowledged the possibility that "the cruelty of pain"
may be present in the challenged punishment, it did not rely on that factor, for it rejected
the proposition that the Eighth Amendment reaches only punishments that are "inhuman and barbarous, torture and the like." Rather, the Court focused on the lack of
proportion between the crime and the offense ....
(citations omitted). Dissenting in Rummel, Justice Powell noted: "In both capital and noncapital
cases this Court has recognized that the decision in Weems v. United States 'proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.'" 445 U.S. at 290 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

1126

DUKE LAW JOURAVAL

[Vol. 1980:1103

legislative prerogative."1 68
Expressing its reluctance to review legislatively determined
sentences, the Rummel Court reiterated that "Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of
individual Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors
to the maximum possible extent."' 69 The Court found that no objective
criteria could be invoked to measure the proportionality of Rummel's
life sentence to the crimes he committed. The Court also chose not to
minimize the seriousness of his offenses, despite their lack of violence,
because "the presence or absence of violence does not always affect the
strength of society's interest in deterring a particular crime or in punishing a particular criminal." 70 As to the small amounts of money involved in Rummel's crimes (a total of $229.11), the Court refused to
hold that these amounts were outside any threshold sum that would
warrant life imprisonment, noting instead that the subjective judgment
of where to draw the line was properly within the province of the state
legislature.' 7' Furthermore, the Court observed that it did not have to
decide whether Rummel's life sentence was proportionate to his offenses because Rummel was not being punished for those offenses specifically, but rather for his status as a three-time offender. 72
168. 445 U.S. at 274. To support this proposition the Court cited Badders v. United States,
240 U.S. 391 (1916), which upheld concurrent sentences of five years' imprisonment and cumula-

tive fines of $1,000 on each of seven counts of mail fraud; and Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S.
616 (1912), which upheld a life sentence imposed upon an "incorrigible horse thief." 445 U.S. at
276. The dissent, however, noted that both of these holdings are of doubtful relevance to Rummel
in Badders,the Court merely explains that a five-year sentence for the commission of seven crimes
is not cruel and unusual and the Court's one-sentence holding in Grahampredates the application
of the eighth amendment to the states. Id. at 290-91 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting).
169. 445 U.S. at 274-75 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 592). In Coker the statement
cited here follows immediately after the "excessiveness" test set forth in that opinion. See 433
U.S. at 592.
170. 445 U.S. at 275. The court cited an example:
Caesar's death at the hands of Brutus and his fellow conspirators was undoubtedly violent; the death of Hamlet's father at the hands of his brother, Claudius, by poison, was
not. Yet there are few, if any, States which do not punish just as severely murder by
poison (or attempted murder by poison) as they do murder or attempted murder by
stabbing.
Id. at 282-83 n.27. Certainly poisoning is a more violent act than, for example, embezzlement.
Accordingly, murder by poisoning is objectively a more serious offense than embezzlement.
Moreover, in Cokerthe Court did not hesitate to distinguish the gravity of murder and rape on the
basis of "moral depravity" and "injury to the person and to the public." See note 113 supra and
accompanying text. As noted by the Rummel dissent, distinguishing the seriousness of crimes on
the basis of the violence involved is surely no more difficult or subjective than distinguishing them
on the basis of "moral depravity." Id.at 295-96 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 275-76.
172. Id. Justice Powell refused to accept this approach, stating that the nature of the offenses
was relevant to an objective proportionality analysis. Id. at 301 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
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The Court next compared Texas's recidivist statute 73 with those of
other states. 174 That only two other states-West Virginia and Washington-could have punished Rummel as severely as Texas did175 suggested merely that Texas was not alone in its view of proper
punishments. 176 Moreover, because recidivist statutes exist in a variety
of forms, the Court thought it difficult to draw interjurisdictional comparisons. The Court noted that a number of states would require life
imprisonment upon conviction of four rather than three felonies, that
others would impose life sentences if one or more of three felonies were
violent, and that still others would permit discretionary life sentences
after three felony convictions. 77 State-to-state variations in "good
time" credits, differing parole possibilities, and the existence of
prosecutorial discretion often exercised in screening out petty offenders,
further illustrated the complexities involved in comparing recidivist
schemes.' 78 Finally, the Court found that even if the Texas statute
were the most stringent in the fifty states, that factor alone would not
make Rummel's punishment "grossly disproportionate" to his crimes:
the principles of federalism permit one state to treat a particular type of
17 9
offender more severely than other states would.
Unpersuaded of the relevance of comparing the Texas statute to
similar statutes in other jurisdictions, the court also played down the
fact that Rummel's crimes were punished as severely as, or more se173. See note 160 supra. Under Texas law a three-time felon receives a mandatory life sentence only if he has served time in prison after each of two successive convictions for felonies and
is then convicted of a third felony. 445 U.S. at 278.
174. In making these comparisons, the Court agreed with Rummel that his inability to enforce
any "right to parole" precluded the Court from treating his life sentence as if it were a 12-year
sentence even though Rummel would theoretically be eligible for parole after serving that period.
Id. at 280. Paradoxically, however, the Court believed that "a proper assessment of Texas' treatment of Rummel could hardly ignore the possibility" of parole. Id. (emphasis added).
175. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.92.090 (West 1977); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (1977).
The majority opinion ignored the fact that nine other states had once enacted statutes as severe as
Texas's but had subsequently repealed them.. 445 U.S. at 296 & n.13 (Powell, J., dissenting).
176. See 445 U.S. at 279.
177. Id. at 279-80. The dissent relied upon these very same considerations as evidencing the
disproportionality of Rummel's life sentence:
More than three-quarters of American jurisdictions have never adopted an habitual offender statute that would commit the petitioner to mandatory life imprisonment. The
jurisdictions that currently employ habitual offender statutes either (i) require the commission of more than three offenses, (ii) require the commission of at least one violent
crime, (iii) limit a mandatory penalty to less than life, or (iv) grant discretion to the
sentencing authority. In none of the jurisdictions could the petitioner have received a
mandatory life sentence merely upon the showing that he committed three nonviolent
property-related offenses.
Id. at 298-99 (Powell, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 281.
179. Id.
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verely than, Texas might punish murder or rape.' 80 Noting that different crimes offend different societal interests, thus rendering
intrajurisdictional comparisons of crimes and punishments "inherently
speculative,"' 8 1 the Court concluded that "a State cannot be required
to treat persons who have committed three 'minor' offenses less severely than persons who have committed one or two 'more serious' offenses." 182 The Court based this conclusion on its perception of
recidivist statutes as a valid means of deterring and segregating incorrigible offenders.' 83 There is "little in the way of objective standards,"
the Court concluded, "for judging whether or not a life sentence imposed under a recidivist statute for several separate felony convictions
not involving 'violence' violates. . . the Eighth Amendment."' 84 The
amount of time a recidivist offender may be incarcerated is thus en85
tirely a matter of legislative discretion.
B.

A Critique of Rummel.

Although Rummel clearly marks a new era of limited application
of the eighth amendment as a protection against excessive punishment,
the extent of the limitation is not certain. The Court may have curtailed the application of the proportionality doctrine only in the context
of recidivist statutes. Indeed, much of the difficulty the Court encountered in relating proportionality analysis to Rummel's case occurred
because Rummel's punishment was premised more on his status as a
repeat offender than on the nature of his individual crimes. The Court
viewed the proportionality doctrine, with its emphasis on making the
punishment fit the seriousness of a particular offense, as largely inapplicable to recidivist statutes. Such a narrow reading of Rummel would
leave courts free to apply the eighth amendment to declare unconstitutional the excessive punishment of a single offense.
States could, of course, effectively bypass this eighth amendment
review of single offense punishments simply by casting the relevant
statute as one directed to recidivism: if conviction for the offense in
question represented the offender's second (or higher) conviction of any
180. See id. at 300-01 (Powell, J., dissenting); c id. at 282-83 n.27 (majority opinion). Firsttime capital murderers in Texas were subject to mandatory life sentences or death. TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 12.31 (Vernon 1974). Aggravated rapists were subject to sentences from five to
ninety-nine years. Id. § 12.32 (Vernon Supp. 1979). A person twice convicted of simple rape
could have received a five-year sentence. 445 U.S. at 301 (Powell, J., dissenting).
181. 445 U.S. at 282 n.27.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 276.
184. Id. at 283 n.27.

185. Id. at 285.
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kind, a harsh sentence could be imposed. Any minor misdemeanor
could thus become the predicate for life imprisonment for a secondtime offender.
This constitutional dodge would not be necessary, however, if
Rummel is read more broadly; indeed, although Rummel addresses a
recidivist statute, there is little reason to limit its holding to such statutes. If the nonviolence and pettiness of Rummel's crimes provided no
objective grounds to invalidate his recidivist punishment, it is difficult
to see how or why such considerations could ever support striking
down legislatively imposed penalties for single offenses. Moreover,
many of the complexities that rendered useless an interjurisdictional
comparison of recidivist statutes by the Rummel Court186-such as
state-to-state variations in defining a given offense, administering good
time and parole, and exercising prosecutorial discretion in screening
out petty offenders-would also render useless similar comparisons of
the various treatments of single offenses.
Whether broadly or narrowly read, however, the majority opinion
in Rummel offers several targets for criticism. One particularly inviting
target is the Court's outright rejection of the death penalty cases as guidance for the constitutional analysis of prison sentences. Although the
Court had previously emphasized the uniqueness of the death penalty
for purposes of eighth amendment analysis, 87 "[n]othing in the Coker
analysis suggests that principles of disproportionality are applicable
only to capital cases."' 8 8 As noted above, 189 the Coker analysis is easily applied in non-capital cases as well. Furthermore, if "qualitative
difference" and "uniqueness" are the keys that open a capital case to
this form of analysis,190 then a distinction should also be made between
life imprisonment and imprisonment for a fixed term, and between any
term of imprisonment and a fine. This is especially true since the
eighth amendment refers to "punishment," and not merely to "execution."
Another target for criticism in the Rummel decision is its departure
from the eighth amendment interpretation of cases like Lynch and
Hart.19 The Rummel Court asserted that Weems should be limited to
186. See notes 177-78 supra and accompanying text.
187. See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
188. 445 U.S. at 292-93 (Powell, J., dissenting). The Coker analysis was that "a punishment is
excessive and unconstitutional if it: (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of
punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and

suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." 433 U.S. at 592.
189. See text accompanying notes 115-17 supra.
190. See note 116 supra.
191. See text accompanying notes 118-31, 147-54 supra.
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its facts; 192 accordingly, Weems cannot provide guidance for assessing
any punishment but cadena temporal. Yet previous Supreme Court decisions in Furman v. Georgia193 and Coker v. Georgia194 have applied
the Weems rationale to the death penalty. To suggest that Weemsjustifiably extends beyond its facts to the death penalty cases because the
capital sanction is more severe than cadena temporal leaves Weems's
inapplicabiliy in Rummel unexplained: Rummel's life sentence is
arguably a more severe punishment than cadena temporal.
An assessment of severity can, of course, be subjective, and the
Rummel Court makes clear that subjectivity is to be avoided. t9 5 Yet
the Court's repeated emphasis on the subjectivity of judgments regarding the seriousness of various criminal offenses is singularly inappropriate in the context of eighth amendment review. Such skepticism
overlooks the judicial duty to apply a constitutional text forbidding
cruelty, an inherently value-laden concept inevitably requiring assessments of moral matters. To be sure, one cannot easily determine
whether a given crime is serious or trivial, or whether one crime is more
or less serious than another, 96 but it does not follow that such determinations are always impossible to make or even that they are inevitably
subjective matters. 97 After all, the Rummel Court itself concededpresumably on the basis of subjective considerations, because it articulated no objective ones-that a life sentence might well be unconstitutionally excessive punishment for the crime of overtime parking. 9 8
Indeed, it is a matter of moral common sense that even "a month in
prison for overparking is too severe."' 99 If the Court's moral intuitions
could reliably guide it to an assessment of punishments for overtime
parking, similar intuitions could have reliably led to an assessment of
Rummel's sentence.
192. See 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980).
193. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See text accompanying notes 92-94 supra.
194. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). See text accompanying notes 109-13 supra.
195. 445 U.S. at 274-76 (1980).
196. Some crimes, such as sex and drug offenses, are particularly controversial. The perceived
seriousness of these offenses often hinges on local standards of decency and particular problems
created by the incidence of the offenses within a given jurisdiction. Note, Disproporlaonalityin
Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1142 (1979).
197. Empirical studies of popular perceptions of the relative seriousness of offenses show substantial agreement among different racial, occupational, and educational subgroups. "[Pleople
from widely different walks of life can make common-sense judgments on the comparative gravity
of offenses and come to fairly similar conclusions." A. vow HiRSCH 79. Rehnquist himself made
such a judgment when he observed that attempted fraud is "no less blameworthy" than actual
fraud. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 276.
198. 445 U.S. at 274 n.ll.
199. Bedau, supra note 14, at 65.
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The Court's rejection of both inter- and intrajurisdictional comparisons is equally troubling for much the same reason. As H.L.A.
Hart has observed:
The guiding principle is that of a proportion within a system of penalties between those imposed for different offences where these have
a distinct place in a commonsense scale of gravity. This scale itself
no doubt consists of very broad judgments both of relative moral
iniquity and harmfulness of different types of offense .

.

..

Yet

maintenance of proportion of this kind may be important: for where
the legal gradation of crimes expressed in the relative severity of penalties diverges sharply from this rough scale, there is a risk of either
common morality or flouting it and bringing the law into
confusing 200
contempt.
The "commonsense scale of gravity" indicates that an offender committing one murder or rape deserves greater punishment than an offender
committing three petty, nonviolent property offenses. 20 1 But even if
one viewed the gravity of a single instance of rape or murder as less
than that of repeated, though less violent, criminal conduct, commonsense justice would certainly preclude inflicting Rummel with the same
punishment that would be imposed on another recidivist offender
20 2
whose three felonies included a rape or a murder.
Yet after Rummel no eighth amendment principle precludes a
state from punishing any offense with any non-capital sentence, as long
as the punishment arguably promotes some penological purpose. If
Texas is permitted to punish Rummel as it has, why cannot highly urbanized State X punish overparking, a matter of serious concern in the
state because of inadequate parking space and insufficient mass transportation, with life imprisonment if the legislature sees a strong need to
deter overparking? Moreover, in the Rummel Court's view it would be
constitutionally irrelevant that every other state imposed less severe
punishments for overparking, and that State X, because its low incidence of violent crime required little deterrence, punished rape and
murder less severely than overparking.
200. H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Princolesof Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1, 25 (1968).

201. The judicial practice of assessing proportionality by comparing the challenged
sentences with those authorized by other states for similar offenses arose in the course of
reviewing sentences for murder, rape, and forgery, traditional crimes about which the
opinion on relative gravity varies little from state to state. In the rare instances in which
the relative severity of punishments authorized for traditional crimes conflicts with the
widely held opinion of the offense's gravity, courts should feel confident in overturning
the sentence as disproportionate.
Note, supra note 196, at 1142 (footnotes omitted).
202. See id. 1165. In Texas, three non-capital murders or three rapes would be punished
under the same statute applied to Rummel. See note 160 supra for the statutory language.
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Furthermore, the rejection of Rummel's life sentence based on
common-sense justice or under the Weems's proportionality analysis
would not have offended the principle of federalism. Although federalism acknowledges the power of states to experiment with a variety of
methods for dealing with deviancy, 203 that power is subject to the substantive limits of the eighth amendment's guarantee against cruel and
unusual punishment. 20 4 Mr. Justice Brennan's criticism of the Court's
recent performance in protecting individual rights is telling:
Adopting the premise that state courts can be trusted to safeguard
individual rights, the Supreme Court has gone on to limit the protective role of the federal judiciary. But in so doing, it has forgotten
that one of the strengths of our federal system is that it provides a
double source of protection for the rights of our citizens. Federalism
is not served when the federal half of that protection is crippled. 205
Fears that federal intervention into state legislative decisions
under a subjective standard would be excessive can easily be allayed by
a requirement that courts adhere to objective standards such as
Weems's interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional comparisons. Even
under the gentlest scrutiny, the fact that Rummel would have been
punished far less severely had he committed his offenses in any of
forty-seven other states supports the common-sense conclusion that the
Texas punishment was too severe.
The Court's failure to apply common-sense judgments and objective principles of proportionality to Rummel's case resulted in the affirmation of a punishment disproportionate to both the fault of the
offender and the harm to his victims. This outcome portends damage
to the integrity of the criminal justice system itself because it "risks
confusing and flouting common morality and bringing the law into
206
contempt."
203. The doctrine of federalism is often viewed as a means of encouraging state-to-state experimentation with a variety of different punishment schemes. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
at 618-19 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
204. See Note, supra note 196, at 1134.
205. Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protection of IndividualRights, 90 HARV. L. REv.
489, 502-03 (1977) (footnotes omitted). The need for federal review of state punishments is espe-

cially necessary in light of the apparent irrationality sometimes manifested in administering the
criminal sanction. For example, in a single jurisdiction one offender committing robbery by assault received an eight-year sentence while another offender committing the same crime received a
fifty-year sentence. See Goudeau v. State, 478 S.W.2d 456 (rex. Crim. 1972); Grayson v. State,
468 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). Moreover, for the seemingly less serious offense of possession of marijuana, one offender was sentenced to 100 years of imprisonment. Albro v. State,
502 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Crim. 1973). Texas appellate courts upheld all of these sentences against
constitutional attack on grounds of cruel and unusual punishment.
206. H.L.A. HART, supra note 200, at 25.
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ALTERNATIVE CHECKS ON EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT

Although the Rummel Court paid lip service to the proportionality
doctrine, 20 7 it effectively abandoned it. Hence, the Court has virtually
precluded the future use of the eighth amendment as a check on excessive punishment except in capital cases. Rummel's failure to require
that punishment be tied to the nature of the offense, and its, rejection of
inter- and intrajurisdictional comparison, effectively drained the
strength from each of the objective criteria used in Weems and in lower
court decisions to assess the excessiveness of punishments. 20 8 The fears
of one commentator appear to have been borne out by Rummel: The
eighth amendment has become "moribund"; "cruel and unusual punishment" is simply a "shibboleth" in the context of excessive incarceration.20 9
We are left, then, with a situation of increasing use of determinate
sentencing, with its attendant risks of punishment disproportionate to
offender fault and victim harm, and without eighth amendment checks
on such punishment. Because no new procedure in the criminal justice
system is likely to replace judicial review, various other means of limiting excessive punishment must now assume greater prominence than
before. Effective use of these mechanisms can partially compensate for
Rummel's emasculation of prior case law.
A.

Drafting Considerations.

Injustice in sentencing can be largely avoided if legislatures exercise wisdom in drafting determinate sentencing schemes. Three considerations are particularly crucial: a general attitude of parsimony in
administering incarceration, a choice of presumptive rather than
mandatory sentencing systems, and care in defining the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances called for under presumptive systems.
1. Parsimony in Use of Imprisonment. The risk of excessively
long imprisonment can be reduced if prison terms are imposed only
when less restrictive sanctions would fail to achieve defined social pur207. See note 164 supra.
208. Rummel does not specifically mention the "least drastic means" analysis applied in the
lower court cases. Its status as an eighth amendment standard is strongly called into question,
however, by the Rummel Court's uncritical acceptance of the penological objectives of isolation
and deterrence as sufficient justification for Rummel's sentence. Clearly, the Court is unconcerned about whether those penological objectives could be effectively realized through alternatives less drastic than a sentence of life imprisonment.
209. See Mulligan, supra note 158, at 649.
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poses.2 10 If less restrictive sanctions would be inappropriate, the dura-

tion of incarceration for a given crime should be the minimum period
that the typical first offender committing the crime in the typical fashion deserves, and that is necessary to protect the state's interest in deterring the crime. 21' Longer incarceration for subsequent convictions can
be provided,212 but again only to the extent necessary to satisfy considerations of desert and deterrence. 213 A limitation such as three or five
years should be set, before which the courts will not look to find offenses to be counted under a recidivist statute. Furthermore, punishment for recidivism should be expressly proportioned to the underlying
offenses.
Clearly this balancing of desert and utility will not always yield
satisfactory results. While the typical offender may deserve x years imprisonment for a given crime, considerations of deterrence may be
thought to require x + 1 years. Such situations should be relatively
uncommon, however, if (as it seems) deterrence is promoted more effectively through certainty than through severity of punishment. 21 4
Even a compromise between desert and deterrence is unlikely to constitute disproportionate punishment if the principle of parsimony is observed. Moreover, the requirement that punishment be set for the
typical first-time offender-not for the occasional egregious wrongdoer-helps to ensure that punishment will be proportionate to the
gravity of the offense and to the culpability of most offenders, not only
in an absolute sense but also in relation to offenders committing other
offenses.
2.

Presumptive Rather Than Mandatory Sentencing. Although

defining punishment in terms of typical offenders committing crimes in
typical fashions will roughly proportion the punishment to victim harm
and offender fault, a presumptive sentencing system allows an even
closer proportioning. Attention to such criteria as the offender's motive
210. See N. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 60-62. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962) for an embodiment of the principle of parsimony in administering punishment; TASK FORCE REPORT 32 ("We urge that, in general, presumptive sentencing be accompanied by a considerable reduction in the lengths of sentences authorized by legislatures, imposed by
courts, and served by prisoners"); A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN 104 (standards governing
durations of imprisonment must be parsimonious).
211. See TASK FORCE REPORT 20.
212.

See id.

213. Abandoning concerns for rehabilitating and isolating offenders in favor of considerations
of desert and deterrence is necessary if punishments proportionate to crimes are to be set legislatively. Such an approach is, of course, consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of the determinate sentencing movement. See notes 30-42 supra and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., J. WILSON, supra note 5, at 174.
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for committing the crime, his powers of self-control, the strength of the
temptations facing him, and his social and cultural upbringing is re21 5
quired if punishment is to correspond accurately to offender fault.
Victim harm also may vary from case to case, depending on the manner in which the crime was committed. Presumptive sentencing takes
these variable elements into account to provide a check on excessive
incarceration; mandatory punishment schemes lack this check.
The flexibility of presumptive systems need not reintroduce the
very drawbacks of indeterminate systems that the determinate sentencing movement seeks to avoid.21 6 Deviations from the presumptive

norm can be controlled through the careful, prudent defining of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
3.

Care in DefiningAggravating andMitigatingConditions. Crim-

inal justice theorists have suggested two basic approaches to defining
the aggravating and mitigating conditions that justify deviations from
presumptive sentences. One approach is to state broad principles of
aggravation and mitigation;21 7 the other is to list specific aggravating

and mitigating circumstances. 218 Although either approach could assist
in proportioning punishment to offender fault and victim harm, a specific listing is preferable, because its precise focus on relevant circum-

stances diverts attention from those circumstances that are

2
inappropriate for consideration.

9

215. See note 11 supra.
216. See text accompanying notes 29-38 supra.
217. See, e.g., A. VON HIRSCH 100.
218. Continental European systems commonly list specific aggravating and mitigating factors.
See Mueller & LePoole, Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences: A ComparativeStudy,
21 VAND. L. REV. 411, 424-29 (1968).
219. A good model list of aggravating and mitigating conditions is provided by a report of the
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT. Listed as aggravating
factors are:
1. The defendant was the leader of the criminal enterprise.
2. The crime involved several perpetrators.
3. The crime involved several victims.
4. The victim or victims were particularly vulnerable.
5. The victim or victims were treated with particular cruelty during the perpetration of
the crime.
6. The degree of physical harm inflicted on the victim or victims was particularly
great.
7. The amounts of money or property taken were considerable.
8. The defendant, though able to make restitution, has refused to do so.
9. The defendant had no pressing need for the money taken; he was motivated by
thrills or by the desire for luxuries.
10. The defendant has threatened witnesses or has a history of violence against witnesses.

The following constitute mitigating conditions:
1. The defendant played a minor role in the crime.
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Prosecutorialand Jury Discretion.
Excessive punishment is also less likely if prosecutors bring

charges under determinate sentencing schemes against only those offenders believed to merit the full measure of punishment set for the

offense. 220 Such an exercise of discretion is not necessary when prosecutors seek convictions within indeterminate sentencing systems, because the sentencer can exercise discretion to impose punishment

proportionate to the fault of particular offenders. But under mandatory
sentencing systems, if decisions about the proportionality of a fixed sen-

tence to the culpability of a particular offender are to be made at all,
they must be made by the prosecutor in deciding whether or not to seek
22 1
conviction.
The jury can also provide a check on excessive punishment once a
case comes to trial, provided that mitigating circumstances have come
to light. In the extreme case, if the jury has evidence of a defendant's
good motives or other exculpatory considerations, it can simply exerThe defendant committed the crime under some degree of duress, coercion, threat,
or compulsion insufficient to constitute a complete defense but which significantly
affected his conduct.
3. The defendant exercised extreme caution in carrying out the crime.
4. The victim or victims provoked the crime to a significant degree by their conduct.
5. The defendant believed he had a claim or a right to the property.
6. The defendant was motivated by a desire to provide necessities for his family or
himself.
7. The defendant was suffering from a mental or physical condition that significantly
reduced his culpability for the offense.
8. The defendant, because of his youth or old age, lacked substantial judgment in
committing the crime.
9. The amounts of money or property taken were deliberately very small and no harm
was done or gratuitously threatened against the victim or victims.
10. The defendant, though technically guilty of the crime, committed the offense under
such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely that a sustained intent to violate the
law motivated his conduct.
TASK FORCE REPORT 44-45. Several of the factors are vague, perhaps purposely so, permitting
leeway to accommodate the equities in particular cases. Moreover, the Task Force's report grants
common law expansion of the list if, after a hearing, the sentencing judge decides that an unlisted
factor constitutes a legitimate aggravating or mitigating circumstance. Id. 47. If an unlisted factor
is used, however, the sentencing judge must write a reasoned opinion, subject to appellate review,
stating why the factor is appropriately considered in sentencing. Id. 21. Finally, the sentencing
authority is permitted to deviate from the presumptive sentences only if the number of aggravating circumstances substantially exceeds the number of mitigating circumstances, or vice versa. Id.
46.
For other examples of the "listing" approach, see id. 44-45. See also Fogel, PursuingJustice
in Corrections, in JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 14, at 125, 144-46.
220. "The responsibility of a public prosecutor . . . is to seek justice, not merely to convict. . . . [T]he prosecutor. . . should use restraint in the discretionary exercise of governmental
" ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REpowers, such as in the selection of cases to prosecute ...
SP'ONSIaILITY EC 7-13 (1976).
221. Whether this additional degree of prosecutorial discretion is desirable is a matter beyond
the scope of this Article.
2.
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cise its discretion to acquit. 222
C. Problems with DraftingandDiscretionaryApproaches.
Although careful drafting of determinate sentencing statutes
might, in theory, ease the problem of excessive incarceration, as a practical matter, such a solution is unlikely to work, for reforms that impose
223
parsimonious punishments for crime are often politically unpopular.
Moreover, reliance on prosecutorial discretion to check excessive punishment will often be misguided, because particular mitigating factors
may be unknown at the time the offender is charged. Consequently,
prosecutors may be unwilling to examine carefully such factors once
they are convinced that an accused should be charged, and have initiated proceedings. Finally, the jury may be unable to exercise its discretion to acquit in light of mitigating circumstances of particular cases.
For example, unless the defendant's "good motives" go to one of the
recognized substantive defenses such as necessity or self-defense, they
may be considered inadmissible and thus may never be brought to the
jury's attention.224 In addition, when the lack of "mental illness" precludes an insanity defense, mitigating factors such as social, cultural,
and economic deprivation, and special inabilities to resist temptation
and to exercise self-control, will also be inadmissible. 225 Unless the
substantive defenses are relaxed to encompass the full range of mitigating factors 226 they will likely remain outside the jury's consideration.
Given these weaknesses in legislative, executive, and administrative
checks on excessive punishment, additional safeguards in the form of
judicial review of determinate sentences are necessary.
D.

The Needfor JudicialReview.

Although Rummel may have crippled judicial review of sentences
of state prisoners, the eighth amendment can remain an effective vehicle for preventing excessive incarceration in the federal system. Without the concerns of federalism to restrain them, federal courts may be
more inclined to strictly scrutinize federal criminal sentences. The
eighth amendment may even retain some vitality in state cases if Rum222. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW 208 (1972).
223. See Alschuler, supra note 15, at 569; A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN 85-86.
224. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 222, at 205-07.
225. H. FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 232 (1972). See also note 11
supra.
226. The author has previously made such a recommendation. Gardner, The Renaissance of
Retribution-An Examination of Doing Justice, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 781, 808-11.
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mel is limited to the context of recidivist offender statutes. 227
A more promising judicial device than the eighth amendment for

restraints on state-imposed punishments, however, is review under state
constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. 228
As illustrated by the California Supreme Court decisions in In re
Lynch 2 29 and In re Foss, 2 30 state courts are free under such provisions

to carry forth the proportionality analysis developed by the Supreme
Court in Weems and in the capital punishment cases. This is true even
if _Rummel extends beyond recidivist statutes to cover all cases of im-

prisonment, because states may interpret the wording of their own constitutions differently from the interpretation federal courts give

identical wording in the United States Constitution, as long as greater
protection of individual rights is afforded by the state's interpretation. 23 1 Opinions like Lynch and Foss that grant greater protection
than the federal constitution provides under Rummel are therefore immune from review by federal courts.2 32 "With federal scrutiny dimin-

ished, state courts must respond by increasing their own.

'233

Whether or not other state courts will follow the California

Supreme Court's lead in requiring punishment to be proportionate to
the fault of the offender as a matter of state constitutional doctrine remains to be seen. Certainly, elected state judges may feel the same
227. See text accompanying notes 185-86 supra.
228. The prohibitions contained in the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution are found in one form or another--sometimes elaborate, most often terse-in the
Bill of Rights or Declaration of Rights in all the state constitutions except in Illinois,
Vermont, and Connecticut. Nineteen states proscribe cruel "or" unusual punishment.
Twenty-two states prohibit cruel "and" unusual punishment. Six states prohibit only
"cruel" punishment, making no mention of "unusual." In Illinois the constitution provides that "all penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense"; Vermont has
no constitutional provision on the matter, but the state Supreme Court has said that the
English Bill of Rights is a part of the common law and as such is applicable; Connecticut
has no constitutional provision and no case directly in point, but in a case in which the
constitutionality of a statute enhancing the penalty for a second offense was an issue, the
highest court in the state quoted with approval the statement: "Nor can it be maintained
that cruel and unusual punishment has been inflicted."
S. RuaIN, LAW OF CRIMINAL CORREtaCION 423 (2d ed. 1973) (footnotes omitted).
229. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972). See the discussion in text accompanying notes 118-31 supra.
230. 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974). See the discussion in text
accompanying notes 132-44 supra.
231. State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 369 n.6, 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (1974).
232. "[B]y invoking a state constitutional provision, a state court immunizes its decision from
review by this Court." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 600 (1980).
233. Brennan, supra note 205, at 503. Justice Brennan observed that
state courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the
federal Constitution. . . . The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the
fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law-for
without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.
Id. at 491.
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political pressures that restrain legislative action assuring proportionate
punishment. Because checks on excessive punishment from legislators,
prosecutors, or jurors are unlikely to be effective, however, state courts
may afford the only significant protection against excessive punishment
in emerging systems of determinate sentencing.
V.

CONCLUSION

The movement to determinate sentencing marks a new era in
American criminal jurisprudence. Many of the injustices of prior indeterminate sentencing models are likely to be alleviated, but new
problems of proportioning the length of prison terms to offender fault
and victim harm are also sure to arise. These problems are particularly
significant because a traditional and increasingly effective mode of addressing them in the past, judicial scrutiny under the eighth amendment, has been emasculated by the Supreme Court's decision in
Rummel v. Estelle. With the virtual removal of the federal courts from
the field of state-imposed punishments, responsibility for assuring justice in the administration of sentences rests squarely on the shoulders of
state agencies. Failure to meet the new challenges that the movement
toward determinate sentencing poses will not only prevent the emergence of a more just and effective system of administering the criminal
sanction, but may well result in a system characterized by harshness
and a tendency to breed contempt not only among those who feel unfairly treated by the system's inflexibility, but also among those whose
duty it is to administer its sanctions.

